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After years of being relatively constant, the homeownership rate-
a target for housing policy- has increased since 1995. This paper at-
tempts to understand why the homeownership rate has been increasing
by constructing a quantitative model and then using this model to eval-
uate explanations that have been oﬀered to account for this increase.
We ﬁnd that the increase in the homeownership can be explained by
innovations in the mortgage market that allows households to take a
positive housing investment position with a much smaller downpay-
ment.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The purchase of a house is the largest single consumer transaction for most
households. This should not be a surprising fact given that housing policy
in the United States has been directed toward enhancing homeownership.
Mortgage interest payments and property taxes are deductible for individu-
als who itemize their personal income taxes. In addition, service ﬂows from
owner occupied housing are not taxed. The government plays an active role
in the mortgage market through Government Sponsored Agencies such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as various programs that subsidize
the entry costs for individuals who want to buy a house for the ﬁrst time.1
Given the focus of policy on the homeownership rate, we present the time
series of this rate since 1965 in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Evolution of the Homeownership Rate





























Average Period = 64.5 
Two important facts seem apparent in this Figure. Until 1995, the home-
ownership rate seems to be stationary around 64 percent. After 1995, the
1For example, the Bush Administration sponsored the American Dream Downpayment
Act which provides downpayment assistance, and has proposed a Zero-Downpayment
Initiative for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured single-family mortgages for
ﬁrst time buyers.
2homeownership rate steadily increases.2 Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) have
pointed out the constancy of the homeownership rate prior to 1996. Based
on this fact, they have questioned the eﬃcacy of the home interest rate mort-
gage deduction policy as means of increasing homeownership. They argue
that the deductibility of the mortgage interest and property tax payments
encourages homeownership by the wealthy, who are already homeowners.
Implicitly, this policy fosters larger home purchases and not necessarily in-
creases in the homeownership rate.
Given government policy toward homeownership, it is important to know
the characteristics of households who not own a home. A simple way to
accomplish this is to see how the homeownership rate varies by income
and age. Figure 2 presents this information for 1995. We see that the
homeownership rate is very low for young households. In fact, after age
40, this rate exceeds 60 percent. In terms of income level, households with
income levels under $45,000 have rates under 60 percent. The information
in Figure 2 indicates that increasing the homeownership rate for younger
and poorer households will result in a large movement in the aggregate
homeownership rate while increasing the homeownership rate for older and
high income households will have a more marginal eﬀect on the aggregate
rate which seemly supports Glaeser and Shapiro’s argument that current
tax policy does not necessarily increase the homeownership rate.
2We formally tested whether a break has occurred in the homeownership rate starting
in 1995. We rejected the null hypothesis that no break was present at the ﬁve percent
signiﬁcance level.
3Figure 2: Homeownership Rate by Age and Income





















































The other fact is that since 1995, the homeownership rate has been
increasing. In Figure 3, we examine the diﬀerence in the homeownership
rate distributions by age and income so we can identify where that largest
changes in homeownership are occurring. In terms of age, the homeowner-
ship rate has increased for all age groups with the largest changes appearing
in households under age 40. If homeownership rates are examined by income
level, we ﬁnd a general increase in the homeownership rate over all income
level with the greatest homeownership increases occurring in income levels
under $60,000. An increase in ownership rate of the young and lower income
households is required if the overall homeownership rate is to increase. This
4leads to the question of what has caused the homeownership rate to increase.
Figure 3: Changes in the Homeownership Rate
Between 1995 and 2003
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This paper attempts to answer the question of why the homeownership
rate has been increasing in the United States. We provide an answer than
account for the increase in the homeownership rate by constructing a quan-
titative model. This model is used to evaluate explanations.3 The model
has the following features: homeownership is part of the household’s port-
folio decision; life-cycle eﬀects play a prominent role; rental and ownership
3The model has applications beyond the focus of this paper. We have used the model to
evaluate the argument that current housing policy, especially the housing mortgage interest
rate deduction policy favors the wealthy. See Chamber, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2004).
5markets coexist; and households make the discrete choice of whether to own
or rent as well as the continuous choice of what quantity of housing service
ﬂows to consume.
Our model is in the tradition of the theoretical construct developed
by Henderson and Ioanides (1983). We employ an overlapping generation
framework with production that allows us to explicitly consider life-cycle
eﬀects.4 Households live a ﬁxed number of years, which includes a retire-
ment period, and maximize expected discounted utility over time subject
to a sequence of budget constraints in an environment of uninsurable labor
income uncertainty. The utility index depends on consumption goods and
housing services. Households make decisions with respect to the consump-
tion of goods, the consumption of housing services, and saving which can
be in the form of either (real) capital and/or housing investment positions.
Hence, the model stresses the dual role of housing as a consumption and
investment good. The investment in housing diﬀers from real capital in that
a downpayment and mortgage are required, and changes in the housing in-
vestment position result in transaction costs. These latter costs associated
with the adjustment of the housing position result in the infrequent changing
of housing investment positions.
The housing durable good generates a ﬂow of housing services that a
household can choose to consume or rent to others. This implies the supply
of rental housing is endogenously determined. The consumption of these
service ﬂows results in the depreciation of the housing stock. Since the
depreciation on the housing stock depends on whether the service ﬂows are
consumed by the owners or renters, these costs must be explicitly recognized
in maintenance expenses.
A market equilibrium is determined as interest rates and housing rental
service rates adjust to clear the capital and rental markets. We employ tech-
niques used in heterogeneous agent macroeconomic economies to solve our
model. Once we have determined the (steady state) equilibrium, the em-
pirical implications of the model are determined and compared with actual
data. Only recently have computational techniques been developed so that
dynamic models emphasizing tenure choice and residence spells could can
be examined.
W eu s et h i sm o d e lt os e ei fw ec a na c c o u n tf o rt h ei n c r e a s ei nh o m e -
ownership. Three explanations are considered. An obvious possibility is
4Some of the other research that examines housing in a general equilibrium general
equilibrium setting are Berkover and Fullerton (1992), Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2002),
Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), Gervais (2002), Nakajima(2003), and Plantania
and Schlagenhauf (2002).
6the decline in the mortgage interest rate. The problem with this explana-
tion is that mortgage interest rates started their decline in 1986 which is a
decade before the homeownership rate started to increase. A second possi-
bility is that buyer transaction costs have declined. FHA estimates buyer
transaction costs have declined 195 basis points since the 1980’s. Our model
predicts an small impact in the homeownership rate as a consequence of a
reduction in transaction costs. A third possible explanation is changes in
government policy that make housing more aﬀordable for ﬁrst time buyers,
or innovations in the ﬁnancial markets that reduce the eﬀective downpay-
ment rate. Examples of latter possibility are an increase in the popularity of
mortgage insurance or new loan products. We ﬁnd that the explanation for
the increase in the homeownership rate is likely innovations in the mortgage
ﬁnancial market.
This paper is organized into three sections. In the ﬁrst section, we de-
scribe the model economy and deﬁne equilibrium. The second section ex-
plains how we estimate the model to the US economy. The third section
examines possible explanations for the observed increase in the homeowner-
ship rate since 1996. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Market Arrangements and the Mortgage Contract
In this economy, households have access to two assets to smooth out uncer-
tainties. Households can invest in a riskless ﬁnancial asset we will call capital
and denote by a0 ∈ A with a net return r, and/or in a housing durable good
denoted by h0 ∈ H with a market price p. The prime is used to denote future
variables. The housing asset generates shelter services according to the a
linear technology function s = g(h0)=h0. Shelter services may be sold in a
rental market at the rental price, R, per unit of shelter.
The decision to invest in housing necessitates a mortgage and a down-
payment equal to ψ percent of the value of the house. The mortgage is taken
for M periods and a payment is required in the ﬁrst period the mortgage
is in eﬀect.5 The decision to invest in housing requires initial borrowing of
BM =( 1− ψ)ph0.T h e ( e ﬀective) mortgage payment in a period depends
on the housing position h
0
,(and the amount borrowed BM), the mortgage
interest rate, rm, the number of periods before the mortgage is paid oﬀ,
5A mortgage payment is made the period the mortgage is written because a household
is able to purchase a home and consume the service ﬂow from that house in the same
period.
7n ∈ M =( 0 ,1,...,M), and policy toward the deductability of interest pay-
ments which we denote by τm. We summarize the mortgage contract is as
a function of (h0,n,rm,τm). The net payment in period n is deﬁned as
m(h0,n,rm,τm) and is determined by the initial amount borrowed less the
amount of interest payments that are deductible, or
m(h0,n,rm,τm)=λrmBM − DM, (1)
where λ =
h
(1 + rm) − 1
(1+rm)M
i−1
and Dn = τm[Bnrm].E a c hp e r i o dt h e
mortgage contract requires a payment that can be decomposed into an inter-
est payment and a principle payment. In any period n during the contract,
the interest payment, In, is equal to the mortgage interest rate times the
outstanding debt at the beginning of period, Bn. The principle payment in
a n yp e r i o di sd e ﬁned as λrmBM− In. After the payment of principle, the
remaining principle, or outstanding debt is Bn−1 = Bn − [λrmBM − In].
2.2 Households
Households are described by preferences, earnings capabilities and age. We
index a household’s age by j ∈ J = {1,2,...,J} where each household lives
J periods with certainty. Household preferences are given by the expected




βj−1u(ϕj,c j,s j), (2)
where β i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,cj is the consumption of goods at age j, sj is
the consumption of housing shelter services at age j,a n dϕj is an exogenous
parameter that captures the evolution of the family size along the life-cycle.
The utility function is neoclassical and satisﬁes the standard properties of
continuity and diﬀerentiability.
A household is endowed with a ﬁx e da m o u n to ft i m ee a c hp e r i o da n dt h e y
supply this endowment to the labor market inelastically until retirement
at age j∗ <J .Households diﬀer in their productivity for two reasons -
age and period speciﬁc productivity shocks. We deﬁne υj as the average
labor productivity of an age j individual. A household also draws a period
speciﬁc earnings component,  , from a probability space, where   ∈ E.T h e
realization of the current period productivity component evolves according
to the transition law Π , 0. Thus, a worker’s gross labor earnings in a given
period are w υj where w is the market wage rate.
8Workers face two taxes on labor income - a tax to fund retirement ben-
eﬁts, τp, and an income tax, τy. After tax labor income is simply (1−(τp +
τy))w υj. During retirement, a household receives a retirement beneﬁtf r o m
the government equal to (1−τy)θw. The household’s current period budget
constraint depends on the household’s exogenous income shock { },i t sb e -
ginning of period asset holding position a, the current housing position h,
the length of the mortgage contract remaining n, the current age j, and the
household decisions with respect to their consumption c, housing consump-
tion s,a s s e tp o s i t i o na0, and housing position h0, for the start of the next
period. To better understand the household environment, we can think of
the household as being in one of ﬁve situations with respect to housing.
Let us start by considering a household that does not have an investment
position in housing, h =0 , and decides not to take a positive housing position
in the next period, h
0
=0 . We will deﬁne y as the income of the household.
The income of a household that is not retired, j<j ∗, depends on the after
tax eﬀective wage and the after tax earnings from the capital investment. If
the household is retired, j ≥ j∗, income depends of retirement beneﬁts, θ,
and the after tax earnings from their capital investment position. We can
deﬁne the income on labor and nonhousing asset holding as:
y =
½
(1 − (τp + τy))w υj +( 1+( 1− τy)r)a, if j < j∗,
(1 − τy)θ +( 1+( 1− τy)r)a, if j ≥ j∗.
Given this income, the household may buy consumption goods c,r e n th o u s -
ing services at the cost Rs, and invest in capital a0. Thus, the budget con-
straint for the household who rented housing services in the prior period
and continues to rent in the current period is:
c + a0 + Rs ≤ y. (3)
The second case focuses on the household who rented in the previous
period, h =0 , but decides to invest in housing, h
0
> 0. This household has
two sources of income. In addition to y, the investment in housing could
also generate income if part of the services from the housing investment are
made available to other households. This possibility is captured by the term
IRR(g(h0) − s) where the housing investment generates g(h
0
) services, and
IR is an indicator function that captures the tax impact that is associated
with renting out part of the housing investment.6 More precisely, we deﬁne
6Henderson and Ioannides impose a contraint that a homeowner can not rent additional
housing services beyond the services that result from the housing investment. We do not
impose this constraint. Thus, the term R(g(h
0
) − s) could be negative. Our numerical




(1 − τy) if R(g(h0) − s) > 0
1i f R(g(h0) − s) ≤ 0
Income can be used to buy consumption goods, invest in real capital,
purchase a house, make a payment on the loan used to ﬁnance the home
purchase, and pay maintenance expenses. We assume all houses are ﬁnanced
with a mortgage where m(h0,n,rm,τm) denotes the period mortgage pay-
ment. The purchase of a house requires a downpayment of ψph0 and the
payment of some transaction costs denoted by φBph0.
Owning housing also generates a maintenance expense. The actual main-
tenance expense depends on whether some of the housing services are rented
to other individuals.7 There is an implicit moral hazard problem in the rent-
ing of housing services to individuals who do not own the house - renters
decide on how intensely to utilize a house, but may not actually pay the
resulting costs. Assume two diﬀerent eﬀorts are available to maintain the
dwelling e ∈ {eL,e H}. The depreciation rate of the housing stock depends
on the eﬀort δ(e). Since a homeowner understands the costs associated with
utilization, an incentive exists to maintain the home, and thus they exert
(high) eﬀort to maintain the house. The depreciation rate for a homeowner is
δO. However, we assume that landlords cannot observe the utilization rate or
maintenance eﬀorts of tenants. As a result landlords assume all renters will
choose the low maintenance eﬀort eL. The depreciation rate associated with
low eﬀort is δR which will exceed δO. The moral hazard problem generates
a kink on the consumer budget constraint on the point where households
choose to consume all their housing services. The market rate for rental
services will incorporate the moral hazard problem and renters have to pay
a premium reﬂecting additional maintenance cost. In the absence of this
problem, renting would be cheaper than owning in the model.8
In order to calculate the appropriate maintenance investment, the amount
of housing that is subject to owner depreciation, δO, and the amount of
the housing investment that is subject to renter depreciation, δR, must be
known. Let hc(s) correspond to the amount of the housing that the indi-
7Henderson and Ioannides argue that there is an externality associated with the rental
of housing services. The individual who consumes the services generated by a house decides
on how intensely to utilize the house, but does not consider the associated costs if they
a r en o tt h eo w n e ro ft h eh o u s e .T h i sa s s u m e sthe mortgage contract can not be written
to explicitly provide for such contingencies. In order to have rental housing services by
non-homeowners, the renter must pay in terms of higher contract rents.
8Household preferences, ﬁnancial incentives, or the allocation of control have also been
used as arguments to explain why renting is more expensive than owning .
10vidual requires given the decision to consume s housing services. If this
amount is exceeds the services generated by the current housing investment
position, h
0
, some additional housing services must be rented. In this sit-
uation, the depreciation costs are determined by the owner’s depreciation
rate, δO, on h
0
units of housing.9 On the other hand, if the individual de-
cides to consume less than the amount of housing services generated from
the investment position, the part of the housing position that the individual
lives in, hc(s), depreciates at δO. The remaining part of the housing housing
investment, (h0 − hc(s)), is rented to other individuals and depreciates at
the rate δR. Hence, the maintenance expense depends on h0 and hc and we
deﬁne a maintenance function x(h0,h c) as
x(h0,h c)=
½
δOph0,i f h c(s) ≥ h0
δOphc(s)+δRp[h0 − hc(s)],i f h c(s) <h 0
The budget constraint for this case is:
c+a0+(ϕB+ψ)ph0+m(h0,M,rm,τm)+x(h0,h c) ≤ y+IRR(g(h0)−s). (4)
A third possible situation is the household that enters a period with a
positive housing investment position, h>0, and decides to sell oﬀ their
entire investment position and rent housing services, h0 =0 . 10 The budget
constraint for this situation is:
c + a0 + Rs ≤ y +[ ( 1− φs)ph − Bn]. (5)
The budget constraint indicates two important features of the housing in-
vestment position. First, if the initial housing position is sold, the individual
must rent housing services equal to Rs. Second, the sale of the house gener-
ates income, ph, minus any selling costs, φs, and remaining principle which
we denote as Bn.11
The last two cases deal with a household that enters the period with
a housing investment position, h>0, and decides to continue to have a
housing investment position, h0 > 0. The critical issue is whether the house-
hold decides to change their housing position. If the household decides to
maintain their housing position, h = h0, then the budget constraint is:
c + a0 + m(h0,n,rm,τm)+x(h0,h c) ≤ y + IRR(g(h0) − s). (6)
9If additional housing services are needed, these services must be rented from someone
else who incurs the depreciation costs.
10In the last period, all households must sell h, rent housing services and consume all




11As our analysis will be conducted at the steady state, we do not have to allow for
diﬀerences in purchase and selling prices.
11In this situation, the household must make a mortgage payment if n>0,
and pays for maintence expenses. Income is dependent on the rental-leasing
decision. It is important to note that in this model the consumption of
housing service ﬂows, and the investment decision are separated. Here,
housing size is related to service ﬂows, and not necessarily the stock of
housing.
If the household decides to either up-size or down-size their housing
investment position, (i.e., h 6= h0, h>0,h 0 > 0), the budget constraint is
more complicated.
c + a0 +( ϕB + ψ)ph0 + m(h0,M,rm,τm)+x(h0,h c) (7)
≤ y +[ ( 1− φs)ph − Bn]+IRR(g(h0) − s),
This constraint accounts for the additional income from selling their home
less transaction costs, φsh, and remaining principle. Income may also be
earned depending on the rental-leasing decision associated with the new
housing position, IRR(g(h0)−s). This income is used for consumption, cap-
ital investment, maintence expenses, and the costs associated with the new
housing position. These costs include transaction costs, downpayment out-
lay, and the current period mortgage payment and are captured in the term
(ϕB + ψ)ph0.
We can combine the various budget correspondences into one general
budget constraint if we deﬁne several indicator variables. Let Ib be a indica-
tor function that is equal to 1 if the household decides to invest in housing,
and zero otherwise. Let Id be a indicator function that is equal to 1 if the
household decides to sell the current position h and is zero otherwise. If
the household has a nonzero investment position in housing, it must decide
whether to rent out some of the shelter services generated by the housing
investment. We will deﬁne an indicator function IL that takes on a value
of 1 if the household decides to rent out (or lease) some of the shelter ser-
vices generated by the housing investment, and zero otherwise. Given these
deﬁnitions, the general budget constraint is:
c + a0 + Ib
£
(ϕB + ψ)ph0 + m(h0,M,rm,τm)
¤
+(1 − Ib)m(h,n,rm,τm)
+p[(1 − IL)δOh0 + IL(δOs + δR(h0 − s)] (8)
≤ y + IRR(g(h0) − s)+Id [(1 − ϕs)ph − Bn].
2.3 The Production Sector
12In this economy, a good, which can be used for consumption, capital or
housing purposes, is produced by representative ﬁrm that attempts to max-
imize proﬁts. The production technology in this sector is given by a constant
return to scale Cobb-Douglas function
Y = f(K,N) ≡ KαN1−α
where α ∈ (0,1) is capital’s share of ﬁnal goods output, and K and N are
aggregate inputs of capital and labor, respectively. Capital depreciates at the
rate δ each period. Given a competitive environment, the proﬁt maximizing
behavior of the ﬁrm yields the usual marginal conditions. That is,
r = αKα−1Nα − δ (9)
w =( 1− α)KαN−α. (10)
The aggregate inputs of capital and labor depend on the decisions of
the various individuals in the economy. From the household’s problem, the
state vector of each agent is determined by the asset position, a,h o u s i n g
position, h, periods remaining on the mortgage, n, idiosyncratic shock,  ,
and age, j.D e ﬁne the household’s state by the vector Λ ≡ {a,h,n, ,j},
and denote Γ as the distribution of individuals over states. Aggregate labor







C a p i t a lw i l lb ed e ﬁned later.
2.4 The Financial Intermediary
The ﬁnancial intermediary is a zero proﬁt ﬁrm. The ﬁrm receives the de-
posits of the household, a0, and pays a net interest rate on these deposits
of r. The ﬁnancial intermediary rents the capital deposits to the ﬁnal goods
sector and oﬀers mortgages to the household sector. These mortgages gen-
erate payments each period.12 In addition, ﬁnancial intermediaries receive
principle payments from those individuals who sell their home with an out-
standing mortgage position. The balance sheet condition of the ﬁnancial
intermediary is:
12The spread between the mortgage rate and the return on capital is assumed to cover
ﬁxed costs.
13Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Loans to ﬁrms Deposits
Net mortgage loans
2.5 The Government
In this economy, the government provides retirement beneﬁts. We assume
that this program is self-ﬁnanced by taxing the labor income at the tax
rate τp. The tax rate is set so that the revenue collected from employed











(1 − Iω)τp υjΓ(Λ). (12)
where Iw is an indicator function that is equal to one when j∗ >J ,and zero
otherwise.
In addition, the government taxes wage income, interest earnings on
capital, and the services from housing investment. It also allows a deduction
on mortgage interest payments, and purchases ﬁnal goods.13 Given this

























where G represents the purchase of goods by the government from tax rev-
enues. The ﬁrst three terms on the right hand side of this equation measure
income tax collection from wage, asset income, and leasing rental income,
respectively. The last term measures the total value of the home mortgage
deduction.
13If government goods enter the utility function in a seperable manner, then the pur-
chases of government goods can be treated as goods that are destroyed each period.
142.6 The Equilibrium Conditions
This economy has three markets: the goods market, the asset market, and






c(Λ)Γ(Λ)+ IK + IH + G = f(K,N) − Υ (14)
where IK investment in capital
IK =( K0 − (1 − δ)K),




































The equation deﬁning the investment in housing reﬂects the change in the
housing capital stock less the depreciation in the initial housing stock due
to depreciation from owners and renters.
The asset market equilibrium condition in this model is diﬀerent from the
asset equilibrium condition in most heterogeneous agent models because of
the availability of mortgages. In this model, the capital stock must be equal
to the total amount of capital deposits from households less the mortgage












15This equation clearly shows that the ﬁnancing of housing crowds out re-
sources in the capital market.
The third market in the model is the rental of housing services mar-
ket. Equilibrium in this market requires that the total demand for housings
services must be equal to the amount of housing services generated by the












We restrict ourselves to stationary equilibria. The individual state of the
economy is denoted by (a,h,n, ,j) ∈ A×H × M×E× J where A ⊂ R+,
H ⊂ R+, M ⊂ R+, and E ⊂R+. For any individual, deﬁne the constraint set
of an age j individual as Ωj(a,h,n, ,j) ⊂ R4
+ as all four-tuples (c,s,a0,h 0)
such that the budget constraint (9) is satisﬁed as well as the following non-
negativity constraints hold:
c>0,s>0,a 0 ≥ 0,h 0 ≥ 0.
Let v(a,h,n, ,j) be the value of the objective function of an individual
with the state vector (a,h,n, ,j) deﬁne recursively as:
v(a,h,n, ,j)= m a x
(c,s,a0,h0)∈Ωj
©
U(c,s)+βE[v(a0,h 0,max(0,n− 1),  0,j+1 ]
ª
where E is the expectation operator conditional on the current state of the
individual.
Deﬁnition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is a collection of
value functions v(a,h,n, ,j): A×H×M×E×J → R; decision rules
a0(a,h,n, ,j): A×H×M×E×J → R+, and h0(a,h,n, ,j):A×H×
M×E×J → R+; aggregate outcomes {K, N,  }; prices {r,w,rm,R};
government policy variables {τ,θ}; and invariant distribution Γ(a,h,n, ,j)
such that
(i) given prices, {r,w,rm,p,R}, the value function v(a,h,n, ,j) and
decision rules c(a,h,n, ,j),s(a,h,n, ,j),a 0(a,h,n, ,j), and h0(a,h,n, ,j)
solve the consumer’s problem;
(ii) given prices {r,w,rm,p,R}, the aggregates {K, N,  } solve the ﬁrms’
proﬁt maximization problem by satistifying equations (9) and (10);
16(iii) the price vector {r,w,rm,R} is consistent with the zero-proﬁtc o n -
dition of the ﬁnancial intermediary;
(iv) the goods market as deﬁned by equation (14) clears;
(v) the asset market as deﬁned by equation (15) clears;
(vi) the rental market as deﬁned by equation (16) clears;
(viii) The retirement program is self-ﬁnancing as stated by equation (12);
(ix) The government budget constraint expressed in equation (13) holds;
(x) letting T be an operator which maps the set of distributions into itself
aggregation requires
Γ0(a0,h 0,n− 1,  0,j+1 )=T(Γ)
and T be consistent with individual decisions.
We will restrict ourselves to equilibria which satisfy T(Γ)=Γ.
4 Calibration and Estimation
We calibrate our model to reproduce some key properties of U. S. economy
observed in 1995-96. Once our model is parameterized, we will evaluate the
model and then illustrate how the baseline model can be used to address the
question posed on the homeownership rate. Calibrating the model amounts
to selecting parameters so that the statistics in the model economy are the
same as those observed in the actual economy. We commence by specifying
the relevant functional forms and certain institutional parameters. We then
discuss the choice of calibration targets. Our estimation of remaining para-
meters will proceed as an exercise in exactly-identiﬁed Generalized Method
of Moments.
4.1 Parameters Set in the Calibration
We select a period in our model to be three years. A individual starts their
life at age 20 and lives till age 80. In terms of our model, individuals live 21
periods. Retirement is mandatory at age 65, (model period 16).










17Along with the discount rate, β, the preference parameters, σ, and γ, must
be speciﬁed as well as ϕj which captures the evolution of the family size
along the life-cycle. The values of β and γ will be estimated. We set the
curvature parameter, σ, to 1.5 which consistent with the literature. We
follow Rios-Rull (2001) in the construction of the family size variable. We
use the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances to identify the adult structure
and number of children in a household. This data is employed to construct
a family equivalence measure following Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles
(2003).14 The inverse of this variable is grouped by household head age and
then a polynomial is ﬁt to the data. We include this factor as the housing
literature has identiﬁed that changes in family size may be an important
factor in the housing tenure choice.
The technology parameters need to be speciﬁed for the aggregate pro-
duction function. Parmeter α is set 0.35 so as to match national income
accounts on the share of capital income in national income.15 Since capi-
tal depreciates when used, we must specify the depreciation rate of capital,
δK. The stock of housing depreciates over time. In this model we allow the
depreciation rate of housing used by renters to diﬀer from the depreciation
rate of owner occupied housing for reasons previously discussed. This means
the parameters δR and δO must be speciﬁed.
Five parameters capture institutional features of the housing market.
The length of the mortgage, M, is set at 10 which corresponds to 30 years,
and the downpayment requirement, Ψ, is set at twenty percent.16 The trans-
action costs associated with buying and selling housing, φB and φS,a r es e t
at 3 and 6 percent. These are consistent with observed buying and selling
fees. We allow for a wedge between the rate of return on capital and the
14The household equivalence measure is equal to (1pj + ηxj)
ζ where 1pt is an indicator
variable for adult structure at age j where 1pt is equal to 2 if the family structure is
classiﬁed as married or equal 1 if not married. The variable xj indicated the number of
children in the household. The parameters η and ζ are set to 0.3 and -0.5 as in Greenwood,
Guner, and Knowles(2003).
15We could have included this parameter as part of the estimation problem. We did not
for two reasons. The value of this parameter is not controversial. In addition, the existing
estimation problem which is embedded as part of the solution problem already stretches
compuational feasibility.
16The 1995 American Housing Survey is employed in the speciﬁcation of these parame-
ters. We construct a dowmpayment fraction using data on value of home purchased and
t h ea m o u n tb o r r o w e do nt h eﬁrst mortgage. A sample of 17,902 households is generated.
The downpayment fraction for ﬁrst time home purchases is 0.1979 while the fraction for
households that previously owned a home is 0.2462. We set ψ corresponding to the ﬁrst
time homeowner downpayment fraction.
The data on length of mortgage is presented in the following table
18mortgage rate of three percent which is close to the diﬀerence between the
a ﬁxed and ﬂoating rate mortgage mortgage rates.
The speciﬁcation of the stochastic idiosyncratic labor productivity process
is extremely important because of the implications that this choice has for
the eventual distribution of wealth. Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001),
STY, argue that the speciﬁcation of labor income or productivity process
for an individual household must allow for persistent and transitory compo-
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is the transitory component and ω is the persistent com-






They estimate Θ =0 .935, σ2
ε =0 .01,a n dσ2
v =0 .061. Fernández-Villaverde
and Krueger (2000) approximate the STY formulation with a three state
Markov chain using the Tauchen (1986) methodology. We use their reported
values, except we adjust these numbers for the three year period horizon em-
ployed in the paper. As a result, the productivity values {1.71,2.79,4.53}









The invariant distribution associated with this transition matrix implies that
an individual will be in the low or the high productivity state just under
31 percent of the time and the middle productivity state 38 percent of the
time. The age-speciﬁc component of income is estimated from earnings data
in the PSID.
T h el a s ti s s u ew em u s te x a m i n ei st h es o c i a ls e c u r i t ys y s t e m . S i n c ew e
are primarily concerned with the behavior of working-age households, we
First Time Repeat







Since most ﬁrst time buyer use a thirty year mortgage, we spectify M to equa1 10.
19choose to calibrate this system to match not beneﬁts but rather taxes. We
set τ =0 .153, the average social security tax rate in the postwar US, and
balance the budget by adjusting the level of beneﬁts. Our inclusion of the
government transfer program reduces the marginal utility of poor, retired
household, and thus minimize possible distortions in the housing decisions
of the elderly.17
4.2 Estimation Targets
The parameters that need to be estimated are the three depreciation rates,
δK,δ O,δ R, the relative importance of consumption goods to housing ser-
vices, γ,and the discount rate, β. We identify these parameter values so that
the statistics in the model economy are the same as ﬁve statistics observed
in the actual economy. Our calibration or estimation of the ﬁve parameters
is an exercise in exactly-identiﬁed Generalized Method of Moments. One
calibration target is the ratio of capital to gross domestic product which is
equal 2.80 over the period 1958-2001. We deﬁne the capital stock in the
U.S. economy as total private ﬁxed assets plus the stock of durable goods as
deﬁned by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. A second calibration target is
the ratio of the housing capital stock to the nonhousing capital stock . The
housing capital stock is deﬁned as the value of ﬁxed assets in owner and ten-
ant residential property. If this measure of the housing stock is subtracted
from the previously deﬁned measure for the capital stock for the economy,
we ﬁnd ratio of the housing stock to nonhousing capital stock to be 0.60.
This data also comes from the BEA.
The next estimation target is the fraction of output that goes to invest-
ment in capital goods. This ratio for this period is 0.073. The fourth target
is the fraction of output that is allocated to investment in housing. For
the same period, this ratio is 0.032 where we deﬁne housing investment as
investment in residential structures. The ﬁnal target is the ratio of the num-
ber of square feet in owner-occupied housing to the number of square feet
in rental housing. Data from the 1995 American Housing Survey indicates
that this ratio is 4.25.
Using these calibration targets, we estimate the utility parameters β and
γ to equal 0.932 and 0.790, respectively. The depreciation rate of capital, δK,
is estimated to be 0.077. The depreciation rate on owner occupied housing,
δ0 is 0.063 while the estimated depreciation rate on rental housing, δR, is
0.078. The estimated parameters and calibration targets are summarized in
17However, it does counterfactually increase the rundown of assets after retirement.
20Table 1. It is important to note that the estimation problem is not separate
from the solution of the model. That is, we jointly solve estimation problem
and model solution. In the appendix, we sketch how the computational
algorithm.
Table 1: Calibration and Estimation of Model (Annualized Parameter Values)
Statistic Target
Ratio of wealth to gross domestic product (K/Y ) 2.80
Ratio of housing stock to capital stock (H/K) 0.60
Housing Investment to Housing Stock ratio (xH/H) 0.032
Ratio owner-occupied to rental housing square feet 4.25
Capital Investment to Output ratio (xK/Y) 0.07
Variable Parameter Estimated Value
Individual Discount Rate β 0.977
Share of consumption goods in the utility function γ 0.790
Depreciation rate of owner occupied housing δO 0.063
Depreciation rate of rental housing δR 0.078
Depreciation rate of capital stock δK 0.077
5R e s u l t s
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the model before attempting
to account for the increase in the homeownership rate since 1995. Obvi-
ously, we are interested in the aggregate homeownership rate generated by
the model. In addition, we are interested in determining whether the model
generates homeownership rate distributions by age similar to the distribu-
tions actually observed. These distributions are an important focus of the
paper because of the stated public policy to increase the homeownership rate
for low income families. We examine whether the share of (net) housing and
assets in the household portfolio are consistent with observe portfolio pat-
terns. Homeownership and rental positions by age are studied.18 Once we
establish that the model is a viable instrument for public policy, we then
turn to the question of why the homeownership rate has increased since
1995.
18Other features of the model such a tenure and duration are discussed in Chambers,
Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2004).
215.1 Model Evaluation
5.1.1 Aggregate Magnitudes
The initial question is whether the model generates reasonable aggregate be-
havior. One aspect of the aggregate behavior of the model we are interested
in is the homeownership rate. Until 1995, the homeownership rate in the
United States was 64.5 percent. The model generates a homeownership rate
of 60.9 percent. Given some of the extreme ﬁnancing assumptions that act
against homeownership that we have i m p o s e do nt h em o d e l ,w ea r ep l e a s e d
with this aspect of the model. Another aggregate we are concerned with is
whether the model ﬁnds a proper mix of rental and privately owned housing.
The model is calibrated to generate the observed ratio of owner-occupied
square feet to rental square feet. However, this does not tie down the distri-
bution of the housing stock between rental units and owner-occupied units
in the steady state. In 1995, the American Housing Survey indicates that 35
percent of the housing stock are rental units. Our steady state equilibrium
ﬁnds that 39 percent of the housing stock are in rental units. Again, we ﬁnd
this an attractive outcome as the model is not calibrated to generate this
distribution.
In equilibrium two prices - the rental price and the interest rate- are
determined while the price of goods and housing are normalized to unity.
We will focus on the interest rate and not the rental price of housing. Our
equilibrium real interest rate in annualized terms is 11.2 percent. This inter-
est rate is quite high compared to actual data. The value is high compared
to values reported in the literature for this type of model. We believe the
high interest rate is a result of two factors. The introduction of housing and
the ﬁnancing of this housing generates a "crowding-out eﬀect" that does not
occur in other models of this type. This is seen clearly by examining the
asset market equilibrium condition (equation (15)). This eﬀect is magniﬁed
since the model does not seem to generate enough of wealthy individuals.
In addition to examining the aggregate behavior of the model, the dis-
tributional behavior of the model also needs to be considered. For example,
if the model replicated the observed homeownership rate, but not the home-
ownership rate over age cohorts or income groups, the appropriateness of the
model for policy evaluation would have to be questioned. Figure 4 compares
the distribution of the homeownership rate by age cohort generated by the
model with the distribution observed in the 1995 American Housing Survey.
The general pattern generated by the model is consistent with the pattern
observed in the data. However, as seen in the Figure, the model underes-
22timates the homeownership rate for younger households. This, no doubt,
is partially attributed to the assumption that all agents face a twenty per-
cent downpayment requirement. In the model, agents must accumulate the
downpayment by saving, thus resulting in no homeownership until house-
holds are in their late twenties. Data indicates actual homeownership rates
are around twenty percent for households in their late twenties.19 After age
forty-ﬁve, the model generates too much homeownership. Between age 55
and age 70, the model implies that every household will be a homeowner.
Actual data indicates homeownership is near ninety percent. The lack of
renters in this age range is a result of the incentives to hold housing and
the earnings process that allows all individuals to be able to have a positive
investment position in housing. In addition, the model abstracts from cer-
tain demographic features, (e.g., a change in marital status) that can result
in an increase in movements into the rental market. The model indicates a
decrease in the homeownership position at the oldest age levels. This is a re-
sult of the assumption that everyone dies at age 80 with certainty. We have
also examined the relationship between income and homeownership rates.
The ﬁndings, not surprisingly, are very similar to the relationship between
age and homeownership. As a result, we do not present these results.
19A possible explanation for the model’s failure to generate homeownership at the
youngest age levels is that bequest or gifts are not considered in the model. The Ameri-
can Housing Survey inquires about the sources of funds for a downpayment. In 1995 only
4 percent of households reported gifts as a source of funds for the downpayment. For
households under age 35, this percentage increases to 6.1 percent. For all households, 74
percent of the downpayment came from savings. Thus, the failure to account for bequests
does not seem to be a critical assumption.
23Figure 4: Behavior of the Homeownership Rate

































Another check on the model is whether the asset allocation in the house-
hold’s portfolio distribution replicates observed holding patterns. We used
the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances to calculate household portfolio val-
ues. We use the respondent’s estimated value of their house adjusted for
remaining principle to calculate the net housing investment position. Since
the only other asset in the model is capital, we combine data on bond and
stock holding to approximate this asset. Bonds are deﬁned as bond funds,
cash in life insurance policies, and the value of investment and rights in
trusts or estates, while stocks are deﬁned as shares of stocks in publicly held
corporations, mutual funds, or investments trusts including stocks in IRA’s.
We use this data to calculate the fraction a household’s portfolio in housing.
We focus only on households that own a home. In Figure 5, we present the
fraction of the household portfolio in housing by age cohort where housing
value is calculated net of remaining mortgage debt. We also include in the
same ﬁgure the gross housing value, eventhough the net value provides a
better picture of household wealth. As can be seen in the upper diagram of
Figure 5, data indicates the fraction of housing is relatively high, but declin-
ing as the youngest age cohorts skew their portfolio toward housing. This
fraction declines as a household income increases and other asset investment
becomes feasible. Between age 30 and age 60, the percent of the portfolio
in (net) housing is relatively constant. This pattern is accounted for by the
additional investment in assets and the decline in outstanding housing debt
coupled with possible additional housing investment. The sharp increase in
24the role of housing in the portfolio is a result of older households reducing
asset levels in order to maintain consumption levels. The literature suggests
a "U-shaped" pattern when examining the relative importance of housing in
the portfolio.20 Prior to age 30, the model indicates housing does not enter
the household portfolio. This is a direct result of the size of the downpay-
ment constraint as well the failure to generate enough wealth so that a young
household may enter the housing market. After age 30, the model generates
households that include housing in their portfolio. The relative position of
(net) housing in the portfolio is relatively constant until age 70 where it
increases. It is also clear that another diﬀerence between the data and the
model is that the model generates too low a fraction of (net) housing in the
portfolio. The lower panel of Figure 5 explains the diﬀerence. In this panel,
we examine gross housing in the portfolio. Except for the lack of ownership
at the youngest ages, the model generates age holding patterns very similar
to what is observed in the data. This suggests that the diﬀerences in the
model generated data and actual data is primarily a result of the assump-
tion that all housing investment must be ﬁnanced with ﬁxed downpayment
and same mortgage contract. Our model does not allow a buyer to put a
downpayment larger than twenty percent down. Data indicates that second
time buyers have downpayments larger than twenty percent.
20Flavin, M. and T. Yamashita (2002) ﬁnd similar holding patterns. Brueckner (1997)
provides a theoretical explanation for this pattern.
25Figure 5: Housing and The Financial Portfolio












































































A third issue in evaluating the model is whether the model is generating
reasonable net rental distributions. In Figure 6, we address this issue. The
housing investment position generated by the model indicates a humped-
shaped pattern with the largest housing position occurring after age 60.
This reﬂects households buying larger houses as well as becoming landlords.
The consumption of housing services, sc, is relatively smooth and increas-
ing.21 The diﬀerence between the housing service position and the housing
investment position indicates the rental position. Younger individuals are
the renters, while older, and presumably richer, individuals are the land-
lords. The upward sloping housing service ﬂow indicates that homeowners
are inhabiting larger homes, indicating changes in the housing position do
occur in the model. In general, these patterns are observed in the data.22
21We have compared the mean adjusted service ﬂow of housing with the mean adjusted
squared feet of owner-occupied housing and ﬁnd that households housing position is un-
derstated in the model. More importantly, the model doen not capture the slight decline
in mean adjusted housing position observed in the data.
22For a more detailed analysis of the housing tenure decision, see Chambers, Garriaga,
and Schlagenhauf (2004).
26Figure 6: Housing and Rental Positions

















In Figure 7, we examine the model from the perspective of the con-
sumption of housing services. The American Housing Survey allows us the
generate average housing size of owner occupied housing in terms of square
feet by age cohort. We demean this data and use it as a measure of hous-
ing services consumed. The model allows us to calculate average housing
services consumed by age where we have also demeaned this series. Prior
to age 60, both series indicate that the consumption of housing services in-
crease with age. However, the amount of housing services consumed is lower
for households under age 60. After age 60, the model implies too much
consumption of housing services as compared to data. This is a result of
not having altruism in the model. Hence, households consume all the assets
before age J.
27Figure 7: Consumption of Housing Services
























































In sum, the model seems to be a reasonable caricature of an economy
with housing. We will now turn our attention to an evaluation of possible
explanations for the increase in the homeownership rate.
5.2 Accounting for the Increase in the Homeownership Rate
We now turn to the question of why has the homeownership rate increased?
An obvious possibility is the lower mortgage rates. A second possibility is
lower buying transaction costs. There have been some changes in housing
policy that have been designed to reduce buying transaction costs. A third
possibility is a decline in the downpayment requirement. This can be a result
of changes in government housing policies.23 Alternatively, ﬁnancial market
innovations in the mortgage market may have occurred which reduces the
downpayment requirement. The development of mortgage insurance and
combination loans are another possibilities. In this section, we will evaluate
some of these explanations for the increase in the homeownership rate.
23The Bush Administration has claimed that the record high of a 68.8 percent occupancy
rates is a direct result their policies to increase the number of minority homeowners. Some
of the policy initiatives are the American Dream Downpayment Initiative Act, the Single-
Family Aﬀodable Housing Tax Credit, and the Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity
(SHOP) program.
285.2.1 The Decline in Mortgage Rates
An obvious explanation is that the decline in mortgage rates allowed more
individuals to purchase housing. The problem with this explanation is that
the thirty-year mortgage interest rate generally declined since 1985. There
was a period in the late 1990’s where mortgage rates actually increased. The
homeownership rate did not begin to increase until 1995-6. This suggests
the decline in mortgage rates is not the likely explanation. Painter and
Redfearn(2002) examine the role of interest rates in inﬂuencing long-run
homeownership rates and ﬁnd that interest rates play little direct role in
changing homeownership rates24
5.2.2 A Decline in Transaction Costs (ϕB)
Another possibility is a decline in the buyers transaction costs. FHA pub-
lishes a series measuring the costs of fees and charges associated with FHA
loans. Since 1985, fees have declined from approximately two percent of
the purchase price to less than 0.5 percent of the purchase price. Part of
this decline in buyer transactions is due to a number of private programs,
such as the Nehemiah Program, the AmeriDream Downpayment Assistance
program, the HART Action Resource Trust, Consumer Debt Solutions, and
Partners in Charity, that have developed over the last decade to reduce clos-
ing costs.25 In order to investigate the impact of reduction in transaction
costs, we reduce the buying cost parameter from 0.03 to zero.
The result of this policy is to increase the aggregate homeownership rate
to 62.7 while the annual real interest rate increases to 11.22 percent. This is
an increase in the homeownership rate of 1.8 percent. The actual increase in
24Our model only allows steady state analysis. We could examine the impact of a
d e c l i n ei nt h ew e d g eb e t w e e nt h er i s kf r e er a t ea n dt h em o r t g a g ei n t e r e s tr a t ew h i c hi sa
relative change in the return on the two assets. The wedge can be thought of as capturing
the diﬀerence between the (long term) mortgage rate and a risk free government bond.
Using the 30 year FHA mortage rate and the interest rate on a one year government bond
(secondary market), we found no evidence that the spread changed since 1995. Although
interesting, we do not examine the eﬀect of a decline in the wedge in this paper..
25The Nehemiah program is especially interesting. The program provides gift funds for
downpayments and closing costs to qualiﬁed homebuyers using an eligible loan program
if the household can have one percent of the sales price of the house in the bank. The
home buyer’s loan can not result in a montly payment that exceeds 29 pecent of income
for PITI. The seller makes a contribution to the Nehemiah Corporation for three percent
of the sales price of the house which is restricted by the appraisal value, and a procssing
fee of $499. The beneﬁts to the seller include access to a widermarket of homebuyers and
a reduced need to negotiate prices.
29the homeownership rate between 1965 and 2003 is 3.6 percent. This suggests
that a decline in transaction costs can not be the entire explanation.
What is the implication of a decline in the transaction cost associated
with a home purchase? In Figure 8, we compare the homeownership rate by
age for the model with zero buying costs with the benchmark model. As can
be seen, zero buying costs do not allow households to buy a house sooner.
The twenty percent downpayment assumption is a large enough wedge to
keep households out of the market. However, around age 27, we do see in-
creases in the homeownership rate. The interesting result is that the decline
in buyer transaction costs results in an increase in homeownership between
age 35 and age 55. Compared to the data, the model over predicts home-
ownership starting at age 40. In the benchmark model, the overprediction
began in the late 40’s. The model still under forecasts homeownership under
age 40.
Figure 8: Impact of a Change in the Buyers Transaction Costs
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5.2.3 A Decline in the Downpayment Requirement
A third possible explanation focuses on the downpayment requirement. Gov-
ernment programs have been developed to reduce the size of downpayment
for ﬁrst time, low income households. The Clinton Administration enacted
policies through the Federal Home Administration (FHA) to have lower
downpayment requirements with mortgage insured loans. The Bush Ad-
ministration has developed the Zero-Downpayment Initiative for FHA to
30generate additional ﬁrst time home buyers. These programs, no doubt, had
a positive impact on the homeownership rate. However, during this period,
ﬁnancial innovations in the mortgage market occurred that allowed home-
ownership with minimal downpayments.
In Table 2, we present some data on the downpayment percentage from
various samples of the American Housing Survey.
Table 2: Downpayment Percentages by Loan Type
Type of Loan
1995 1999 2001 2003
Type of Buyer FHA Other FHA Other FHA Other FHA Other
First-time 21.6% 29.8% 13.8% 22.1% 18.1% 24.5% 16.3% 24.1%
Repeat 22.0 33.3 16.7 24.3 22.4 29.1 26.5 28.5
Total 23.2 33.5 16.0 25.7 19.9 27.4 22.6 27.0
As can be seen, between 1995 and 1999 the downpayment percentage sub-
stantially declined. During this time, mortgage insurance became more pop-
ular which allowed individuals to enter the housing market without having
the required twenty percent downpayment. All FHA loans required mort-
gage insurance if the loan-to-value ratio exceeds eighty percent. Mortgage
insurance essentially allows the homeowner to trade oﬀ t h es i z eo ft h ed o w n -
payment for a higher monthly payment until the loan-to-value rate declines
to eighty percent. This seems a possible explanation and suggests govern-
ment policy could have played an important role. However, as can be seen in
Table 2, the downpayment ratio is higher in the 2001 and 2003 surveys. This
suggests the answer can not be due entirely to an increase in the popularity
of mortgage insurance.
During this time another innovation occurred in the mortgage ﬁnan-
cial markets that lessened the downpayments requirement and allowed for
the avoidance of mortgage insurance. The "80-20" Combo loan and the
"80-15-5" mortgage loan products became popular. The former program
corresponds to the traditional loan-to-value rate of 80 percent using a sec-
ond loan for the 20 percent downpayment. The "80-15-5" mortgage product
requires a 5 percent downpayment provided by the home purchaser with the
remaining 15 percent coming from a second loan. The second loan has an
interest rate approximately 2 percent higher than the interest rate on the
primary mortgage. Government sponsored mortgage agencies initiated the
use of this product in the late 1990’s and this mortgage product became
popular in private mortgage markets between 2001 and 2002. Even ignor-
ing tax considerations, this product dominates mortgage insurance. Table
3 examines the annual payment for a ﬁrst time buyer under two diﬀerent
31mortgage contracts. The ﬁrst contract has a ﬁve percent downpayment with
mortgage insurance. The second option is a combo loan of "80-15-5" variety.
The calculations assume a thirty year loan with a ﬁxed interest rate. The
second mortgage is assumed a thirty year ﬁxed loan with a two percent inter-
est rate premium. We compare the cost of these two products for diﬀerent
interest rates and diﬀerent marginal tax rates. Given our assumptions, we
see that the annual payment associated with the "80-15-5" product is lower
over all interest rates. For example, at a 5 percent mortgage interest rate
and no tax beneﬁt, the combination loan product saves the home purchaser
approximately $500 in annual mortgage payments. The reason that the
combination loan dominates a loan with mortgage insurance is that insur-
ance premium is based on the full loan value. Tax considerations make the
beneﬁts from the combination loan product even greater due to the higher
interest payments associated with this loan.
Table 3: A Loan with Mortgage Insurance vs. a Combo Loan
Loan with Combination
Mortgage Insurance1 Loan2
Income Mortgage Annual After Deduction Annual After Deduction
Tax Rate Rate Payment Payment Payment Payment
.00 5% $6,929 $6,929 $6,412 $6,412
.12 5% 6,929 6,359 6,412 5,806
.20 5% 6,929 5,979 6,412 5,402
.00 7% 8,405 8,405 7,906 7,906
.12 7% 8,405 7,607 7,906 7,072
.20 7% 8,405 7,075 7,906 6,516
.00 11% 11,677 11,677 11,203 11,203
.12 11% 11,677 10,423 11,203 9,913
.20 11% 11,677 9,587 11,203 9,053
Hence, it appears that a decline in the downpayment fraction as a result
of innovations in the mortgage ﬁnancing may be key to understanding why
the homeownership rate has increased. Table 4 reports the response to the
question inquiring about the source of the downpayment from the 1995 and
2003 American Housing Surveys. Focusing on households under age 35, we
see that the importance of saving and and gifts declined in importance while
the fraction fraction of ﬁrst time buyers with no downpayment increased.
These facts are consistent with an increase in popularity of combination
loans. we also see an increase in the role of other borrowing. This likely
32reﬂects respondents use of the second loan included in the combo loan.
Table 4: Downpayment Sources for First-Time Buyers
(By Age)
1995 2003
Total <35 Total <35
Savings 73.97 75.13 73.91 73.56
Sale Other Investment 0.68 0.74 0.91 0.81
Other Borrowing 4.68 3.24 5.31 4.99
Inheritance or Gift 4.00 6.10 3.95 4.22
Land Collateral 0.85 0.74 0.96 0.83
Other 5.85 5.36 5.21 5.5.3
No downpayment 9.97 8.70 9.74 10.06
In order to investigate ﬁnancing innovations in the mortgage market,
we introduce a the combo loan product into our model. That is, we lower
the downpayment requirement to 5 percent and allow a second mortgage
to be used for the remaining portion of the downpayment. We assume the
interest premium on the second mortgage is two percent. Both mortgages
have a thirty year duration. The aggregate implications of this change is
to increase the homeownership rate to 71.0 percent, or an increase in the
homeownership rate of 10.12 percent. Again, the actual change in the data
is 3.6 percent, so this change substantially overstates the actual change. The
equilibrium interest rate increases to 11.25 percent.
In Figure 9, we show how the homeownership rate changes by age co-
hort. The reduction in the downpayment requirement now allows younger
households to take a housing investment position. Prior to age 35, this loan
package allows younger households to enter the housing market. This part
of the distribution is much closer to the distribution observed in the data
and is an improvement over the performance of the benchmark model. For
households greater that age 35, the combo loan product generates home-
owner ship rates exceeding what is observed in the data. After age 55, the
model generates housing behavior that is identical to the benchmark model.
That is, all households have a positive position in housing. The model’s
overprediction of the homeownership rate is a direct result of the assump-
tion that any household who want to take a position in housing must use
this product. Higher downpayment fractions are not a choice variable. In
sum, the decline in the downpayment percentage seems to be the key to
understanding the increase in the homeownership rate.
33Figure 9: Impact of a Change in the Downpayment Fraction
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6C o n c l u s i o n s
Since 1995, the homeownership rate has been steadily increasing after years
of being relatively constant at 64.5 percent. Movements in the homeowner-
ship in the United States is important because of the stated policy to have
a high homeownership rate. We examined possible explanations for the in-
crease in this rate use a dynamic general equilibrium modeling the tradition
of Henderson and Ioanides. The model has the following features: home-
ownership is part of the household’s portfolio decision; life-cycle eﬀects play
a prominent role; rental and ownership markets coexists; and households
make the discrete choice of whether to own or rent as well as the choice of
what quantity of housing services to consume. We ﬁnd that the model does
reasonably match various data from 1996. As a result, we use the model to
evaluate various explanations for the increase in the homeownership rate.
We ﬁnd the likely explanation for the increase in the homeownership rate is
innovations in the mortgage ﬁnancial market which essentially reduces the
downpayment requirement for a (ﬁrst-time) home-buyer.
Our evaluation of the model indicates a number of areas where more
research is required. For example, the fact that every household owns a
home after age 45 in the model while the homeownership rate never exceeds
ninety percent in the data for these household requires additional study.
The assumption that all households must have a ﬁxed downpayment with
34a ﬁxed duration loan may be important. The introduction of alternative
mortgage contracts is an interesting extension. Finally, the assumption that
housing and goods prices are one should be relaxed. This means moving to
a multisector model. These are issues we are presently pursuing.
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368 Appendix: Computational Method
We discretize the state space by choosing a ﬁnite grid over capital, and
the housing investment. We restrict optimal choices to lie on the grid for
capital and housing investment. However, the choices for consumption and
the consumption of housing services are continuous. The joint measure over
assets, a,h o u s i n g ,h, periods remaining on the mortgage, n, income shock,
 , and age, j, which is denoted as Γ can then be represented as a ﬁnite-
dimensional array.
The basic algorithm is as follows:
1. Given the estimation targets, guess the prices (r,R) and the parameter
vector (β,γ,δK,δ O,δ R).
2. Compute K, w,and τp. N is determined by the invariant age-distribution
Π.
3. Solve the household’s problem to obtain the value function v(a,h,n, ,j),
and the decision rules a0(a,h,n, ,j),h 0(a,h,n, ,j),c (a,h,n, ,j),s (a,h,n, ,j)
starting with v(·,·,·,·,J+1 )≡ 0.
4. Iterate on an initial distribution of idiosyncratic states until conver-
gence. This step assumes that the distribution of a and h are only over
a ﬁnite number of points and redistributes mass interatively. This step
generates Γ to calculate relevant aggregates that are need to check the
calibration targets and the two equilibrium conditions.
5. Check to see if calibration targets and equilibrium conditions hold for
ag i v e nm e t r i c .
6. If not, update (r,R)a n d( β,γ,δK,δ O,δ R) and recalculate.
7. Iterate on r,R,β,γ,δK,δ O,δ R, and Γ until convergence.
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